We study the following situation: A seller owns an indivisible object. The game-model consists of finite repetitions of a basic stage game. The basic stage game has the following structure: The seller randomly meets one of the buyers. Then the seller can make an offer-a price to be paid for the indivisible object or the seller can wait and do nothing ("wait" means here that the seller makes an outrageous offer that is certainly rejected). A buyer that has met the seller and obtained an offer can either accept or reject. If the buyer accepts then he pays the agreed sum to the seller, obtains the object, and enjoys a given profit. All other buyers suffer a nonpositive externality that is dependent on the identity of the actual buyer and on the identity of the sufferer. If the buyer that met the seller rejects the offer or if the seller has chosen to wait, then the game proceeds to the next stage that has exactly the same structure unless it is the last stage where the game ends even if the good does not change hands.
We find that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of long, finitely repeated generic games can either display delay-where a transaction can take place only in several stages before the deadline-or, in spite of the random element in the game, a well-defined buyer exists that obtains the object with probability close to one. This buyer is the only one to get reasonable offers in almost all periods.
We note that, when externalities are absent, delay is impossible in the unique SPNE of the corresponding game. The final allocation is then always Walrasian, that is, the buyer with highest valuation gets the good with probability close to one.
Studies that explain delay in a complete information framework are rare. Most of the literature on delay phenomena uses some kind of asymmetry of information (see Kennan and Wilson (1993) for a recent detailed survey of this literature). In the complete information case delay has been first observed by Rubinstein (1982) in a model with fixed bargaining costs. Binmore (1987) showed that a finitely repeated version of the Nash demand game has an "embarrassment of equilibria." Some of those equilibria will display delayed agreements. Shaked (as quoted in Sutton (1986) ) and Herrero (1985) have observed that versions of Rubinstein's discounted model involving more than two bargainers display multiple equilibria. Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) explicitly use the multiplicity of equilibria in other variations of Rubinstein's model to generate inefficient, delayed outcomes. Delays are also obtained in a model where the played game changes along the play path (Fershtman and Seidmann (1991) ), and in a model where the transmission time for offers is random (Ma and Manove (1990) ). The last two mentioned papers also emphasize the importance of deadlines in negotiation. For an excellent survey of the recent bargaining literature see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) .
The intuition of our delay result is fully in keeping with Rubinstein's (1982) message that it is the cost of rejecting the proposer's offer that determines the proposer's payoff. A main feature of our model is the fact that agents' willingnesses to pay endogenously change along the play path. Although nonbuyers always suffer a loss, small losses are better than large ones. Hence, the comparison of losses in different potential situations turns some externalities into "positive" ones, leading to a "war of attrition" type of behavior. Delay in our model cannot be equated with inefficiency. Whereas most of the bargaining literature emphasizes situations where part of the "cake" is lost if delay occurs, in our model the size of the shared cake is endogenously determined and may well have a negative value to society. Total welfare will not necessarily be maximized even in situations that do not display delay. If explicit costs of waiting are introduced delay does not disappear and becomes associated with inefficiency also in the "lost cake" sense. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model and derive some simple concepts for the equilibrium dynamics. In Section 3 we illustrate the delay phenomenon, and we characterize the general structure of equilibria. Proofs are gathered in Appendixes A-D.
EXTERNALITIES AND NEGOTIATION

The Economic Situation
We consider a market consisting of one seller and N buyers, where N ? 2. The seller S owns one unit of an indivisible good. We normalize the utility functions of the agents in such a way that their utility when no trade takes place is equal to zero. The buyers are denoted by i, j, etc..., 1 < i < N. If buyer i owns the indivisible good then his utility is given by ii, where .i > 0. If one buyer acquires the good, then all other buyers are subject to an external effect. The utility of j if i owns the good is given by -aj, where .ij 2 O.
The Negotiation Game
We study a bargaining procedure composed of T stages. The first stage will be called stage T, the second stage will be called stage T -1, and so on until the last stage, stage 1. At the beginning of any stage the seller randomly meets one of the buyers. All buyers have the same probability (i.e., 1/N) to meet the seller. If S and i meet then S proposes a transaction at price p. The price p belongs to an interval [0, P]. The upper bound P satisfies the condition P > maxi{ri + max{ ajil}. Hence, P is strictly larger than any price that will ever be acceptable to any buyer. By proposing an unacceptable price, say P, the seller basically "waits" (we could equivalently endow the seller with such an explicit action). We assume without loss of generality that, whenever the seller wishes to wait, he proposes the price P.
If S proposes p then i can either accept or reject the proposal. If i accepts then he obtains the good, pays price p to the seller, and the game ends. The utility of the seller is given by p, the utility of buyer i is given by si -p, and the utility of buyer j, j # i, is given by -aij. 
Equilibrium Dynamics
We now derive formulae that describe the dynamic equilibrium behavior, and we show that a generic game FT has a unique SPNE. Moreover, this SPNE uses pure strategies.
We first fix U-T, a SPNE in pure strategies for a game FT. For k such that 1 < k < T we denote by Ik the set of potential buyers at stage k (given 0UT). Buyer i belongs to Ik if, given U-T and given that S and i meet at stage k, S makes a proposal p such that i accepts and buys the good. Denote by Ck the cardinality of the set Ik. Denote by pf the maximum price that buyer i would accept to pay for the good at stage k (given ST). Denote by i$ and Vs the expected payoff at stage k (given ST) of buyer i and of the seller, respectively. These values are calculated before nature has selected whom S meets at stage k. Since in the case where the good does not change hands, the utility of all agents is normalized to be zero, we set Vso = 0, Vi, ViJ = 0. We obtain the following The key observation leading to the result of Proposition 2.2 is that genericity rules out equalities of the type pi'k = Vsk 1* Generically, the seller is never indifferent between making an offer that will be accepted and waiting. The conditions in (2.6) completely determine the structure of the sets ak, i.e., 
DELAY AND DETERMINATION
An interesting phenomenon in our perfect and complete information framework is the appearance of delays. Delay is said to occur at stage k if the set of potential buyers at that stage is empty, i.e. Ik = 0. We will show that the equilibrium strategy of the seller may be such that in almost all stages he does not offer acceptable prices to any buyer. In this case transactions will take place only a few stages before the end of the game. The length of this brief activity period is independent of the number of stages played (provided the game is sufficiently long). 
Q.E.D.
The delay phenomenon may, at first glance, seem paradoxical. We now verbally explain its intuition: From the viewpoint of the seller, the attractive buyers are 1 and 2 because they suffer high externalities if buyer 3 obtains the object. Buyer 3 is not very attractive because she suffers no externality at all. As the deadline approaches, the threat to sell to buyer 3 becomes more real because the seller has to get rid of the object. Therefore, the seller may have to wait for a while if he wants to extract higher prices from buyers 1 and 2. The question is then why buyers 1 and 2, who can anticipate all this process, are not prepared to pay at a stage k, k ? 4, the same price that they would pay at the first stage where activity takes place (the third stage from the end)? The answer is that at all stages k, k ? 4, buyer 1 attaches a higher probability (i.e. higher than at stage 3) to the event that buyer 2 will meet the seller and obtain the object. Note that buyer 1 is relatively less afraid of buyer 2 than she is of buyer 3. The same kind of argument applies to buyer 2. Hence, a "war of attrition" is taking place between buyers 1 and 2, where each of those buyers waits for the other one to "save" her from buyer 3.
Note that for large values of E or a maximizing total welfare requires the good to be sold to either buyer 1 or to buyer 2. If delay occurs there is a fixed, positive probability (1/27) that the good will be sold to buyer 3. Total welfare is not maximized even in the limit. For small values of X and E total welfare is maximized if the good remains in the possession of the seller. In this case the outcome will be inefficient even if delay does not occur because the good is eventually sold.
We now briefly discuss whether delay persists in Example 3.1 if the agents discount the future. Note first that the statements in Proposition 2.3 do not hold anymore, but observe that delay first occurs for discount factor 8= 1 because Vi, p4 < Vs . Since the equilibrium values with discounting p/C(8) and Vsk(8) are locally continuous functions of 8, we obtain that, for discount factors close to one, Vi, p4(8) < Vs3 8). Delay persists, but, for a given discount factor less than one, if the game is long enough, the seller cannot wait until the last but few stages to make a reasonable offer. If this were the case, then, evaluated at the beginning of the game, the seller's expected payoff would be very small because of the discounting. The seller would rather prefer to sell earlier and obtain at least a price close to a valuation ri. Hence, potential activity must resume in a sufficiently high-numbered period. It follows that, while the behavior close to -the deadline is not affected by discounting, the situation at earlier stages is qualitatively different. A new phenomenon which we call cyclical delay may Consider now the general case with negative externalities. A priori one might imagine that, in addition to the delay phenomenon, several other types of equilibrium behavior may occur. For instance, the sequence of sets of potential buyers, {Ik}k N, might display either a "chaotic" or a nontrivial cyclical structure. The next theorem states that, for long generic games, there are only two possibilities for equilibrium play: we either encounter a delay phenomenon as in the previous example, or, in spite of the randomness, a unique well defined buyer exists that is the only one to get acceptable offers in almost all stages. In other words, as k goes to infinity, the sequence {Ik}k = N converges either to a singleton or to the empty set. Note first that the sequence {VS}k e N is bounded (by P, say) and nondecreasing, hence it must converge to a limit. Denote this limit by p'. In the absence of delay, there must exist at least one buyer that appears infinitely often in the sequence {Ik}k e . Let i be such a buyer. There necessarily exists a subsequence of {Pik}k N N that converges to pw (see Lemma B.1 in Appendix B). Note that any price of type p/ is given by the sum of Ti and some weighted average of externalities caused by the other buyers. The strategy of the proof is then to show that, if none of the alternatives mentioned in the statement of the Theorem holds, we obtain a contradiction to the genericity assumption. More precisely, assuming the Theorem is false, we derive two distinct equations: To conclude, for long generic games the absence of delay implies the existence of a unique "preferred" buyer i*: in most of the periods the seller will take his chances waiting for i*; "threats" to sell to any other buyer are not credible.
The Role Of The Genericity Assumption
The main message of Theorem 3.2 remains unchanged even if the economic situation is not generic. Uniqueness of the SPNE is not ensured. However, all equilibria for long enough games will display either delay, or serious offers in almost all periods only to buyers who are, in the limit, identical from the point of view of the seller in the sense that they all must be willing to pay the same price close to p' (for instance, two completely symmetric buyers).
It should also be clear that for any other exogenous specifications of matching probabilities we can adapt the definition of genericity to derive the same result as in Theorem 3.2. Since the structure of the sets Ik is, for generic games, determined by strict inequalities, both cases mentioned in the Theorem are robust. To get an idea about the sizes of the parameter sets displaying one or the other case consider again Example 3.1: Delay will occur there, possibly accompanied by more stages of potential activity towards the end of the game, if and only if a > 2.
The Identity of the Preferred Buyer i
What can be said about the identity of i*, the well-defined buyer in the absence of delay? Since a buyer i is never prepared to pay for the good more than vi + maxgi{ agi}, it is readily verified that i cannot be the well defined buyer if there exists a buyer j, j # i, such that rj +aji> iri + maxg#i{agi}.
Together with an argument showing that delay is impossible for situations where N = 2, the last observation yields the following proposition. the case where N = 2.) Unfortunately, neither alternative is necessarily correct in the general case.2 In fact, the identity of i* is generally given by a rather complicated function involving the economic parameters and the matching probabilities. Since an exact specification of matching probabilities does not seem to be fundamental for the economic problem at hand, the important fact is, in our view, that the message of Theorem 3.2 continues to hold for any specification of those probabilities, as discussed above. Moreover, the fact that, with externalities, the identity of the "preferred" buyer (given that such a buyer exits at all) cannot be directly inferred from the economic parameters alone As k E K; tends to infinity we obtain that p' 2 P -A. Because this inequality holds for any A > O we obtain p' >pj. This is a contradiction to jp >p 2p'.
Q.E.D.
We introduce a construction that is repeatedly used in the sequel. Suppose that Ik ? 0 for all k > 1, and that {Ik}k "e N does not converge to a singleton. We will show that this, together with the hypothesis that the situation is generic, leads to a contradiction. The proof is organized in 6 steps. Hence it cannot be that pk1 <SV and p2k+ < Vs. Then Ik+ 1 #0 follows by condition (2.7). Since delay is impossible, we obtain by Theorem 3.2 that the sequence {Ik)k N converges to a singleton. Assume, by contradiction, that the limit set is {1). Buyer 1 is never prepared to pay more than fl + a21. However, in this situation we have limkp-2 = T2 + a12-Since iT2 + a12 > iT1 + a21, the seller could profitably deviate by making an acceptable offer to buyer 2, producing a contradiction.
CONSTRUCnION OF A SEQUENCE
